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SPECULATIVE  DYNAMICS 
ABSTRACT 
This psper presents evidence on  the characteristic speculative dynamics of a wide 
range of  ssset returns.  It highlights three stylized facts.  First,  returns tend to 
be positively serially correlated at  high frequency.  Second, returns tend to be 
negatively serially correlated over long horizons.  Third, deviations of asset values 
from proxies for fundamental  value have predictive power for returns.  These patterns 
emerge repeatedly in our analyses of stocks, bonds, foreign exchange, real estate, 
collectibles, and precious metals, and they appear too strong to  be  attributed only to 
small sample biases.  The pervasive nature of these patterns suggests that they may be 
lie to inherent features of the speculative  process, rather than to variation in risk 
factors which affect particular markers. 
David M. Cutler  James H, Poterba  Lawrence H. Summers 
NBER and MIT  NBER  and MIT  NBER and Harvard 
50 Memorial Drive  Department of Economics  Department of Economics 
Cambridge,  MA 02139  Room  E52-350  Lirtauer  229 
50 Memorial Drive  Cambridge, MA 02138 
Cambridge, MA  02139 The traditional efficient markets wisdom that asset returns are un— 
forecaatable has recently been challenged by a number of  empirical findings. 
Studies of  the historical  time series of  common  stock returns in the United 
States, for example, have uncovered serial dependence  in returns and  also 
shown that lagged dividend—price ratios can forecast a substantial fraction of 
return variation.  Unfortunately,  these results are difficult to interpret, 
because the underlying data set has been analyzed so many times in the search 
for predictable  patterns in returns. 
This paper provides nev evidence on  the robustness of  these findings.  Pe 
use data  on  stock and bond returns in  13 different countries, on  the returns 
to holding five major currencies, as well as on  returns to investing in  gold, 
siiver, real estate, and a variety of  collectible real assets, to explore the 
predictability  of  asset returns.  Our results uncover several patterns which 
characterize  the returns on  most speculative assets.  First, excess returns 
exhibit positive serial correlatthn at  short horizons,  typically over periods 
of  one or several months.  Second, returns are weakly negatively correlated 
over longer horizons,  Finally, crude measures of the deviation between prices 
and fundamental values, the analogues of  the dividend—price ratio for the 
various assets we consider, appear to forecast future returns, particularly 
over long horizons.  Unfortunately, the limited availability of data for many 
of the assets we consider renders the evidence for the second and third 
propositions somewhat weaker than that for the positive short run serial 
correlation. 
This paper  is divided into five sections.  The first section presents 
Monte  Carlo results on  the statistical power of  the autocorrelation  and 
regression tests for return predictability which we  use in our subsequent 
analysis.  We find  that for plausible specifications of the stochastic process 2 
generating returns, regression tests are likely to yield higher power than 
autotorrelation tests.  This finding mppesrs even when  the observable proxy 
for the asset prite fundamental is measured with  substantial error.  It may 
attount for the findings of  earlier researth on  the U.S. stotk market, whith 
have shown that dividend—price ratios  have substantially greater power than 
lagged returns in  foretasting future returns. 
The next two sections apply the autooorrelation and regression tests to 
returns data from a  variety of different asset markets.  Section two analyzes 
the autocorrelations of excess returns, demonstrating the pronounced pattern 
of  positive high—frequency autocorrelation and the weaker  tendency for long— 
horizon returns to exhibit negative serial correlation.  The evidence suggests 
this pattern in a  variety of  specific marketa, even  after accounting for the 
oroas—correisriona of returns across countries. 
Section three coneidera the forecast  power of  measures of  the deviarion 
between prices and fundamental value for returns over various horizons.  The 
findings are generally supportive of  the foreoaat power of  such measures, 
although the results are significantly  weaker than those for the historical 
U.S. time series on  stock returns.  The point estimates for moat  markets, 
however, suggest that as much as 30—40 percent of the devimrion between prices 
and fundamental values is eradicated over a four year period. 
Predictable patterns in  asset returns  could result either from  changes in 
required returns or from inherent features of the speculative process in  asset 
markets, which lead prices to deviate from fundamental valuesJ  Section four 
1Shiller (1984),  Black (1986) ,  Campbell  and Kyle (1987)  ,  DeLong, 
Shleifer, Summers, end Waldmsnn  (1990),  and Curler, Poterba, and Summers 
(1990), among others, discuss models of asset pricing that permit  prices 
to deviate from the rational discounted value of future cash flows. 3 
notes that several factors make existing theories of time—varying required 
returns unlikely explanations for the stylized patterns of  returns which we 
observe.  First,  natural characterizations  of  ex ante returns do not generate 
both positive and negative serial correlation in  ex  post returns.  Second, our 
attempts to include explicit measures of market risk prernia,  such as  a moving 
average of stock recurn volatility, do  not reduce the forecast power of  price— 
fundamental deviations as they should if this variable's explanatory effect 
results from omitted risk terms.  Finally, it seems unlikely that similar 
processes generate required returns in the various markets we  consider, since 
the underlying asset fundamentals and risk factors are quite different,2 
The brief concluding section suggests that explanations focusing on  the 
nature of the speculative process itself,  rather than particular risk factors, 
ire potentially more consistent with these stylized patterns.  Although we do 
not present a formal model, we highlight particular features which we view as 
promising for inclusion in such models,  These include traders  who base their 
asset demands on  prior returns, as well as traders who adapt their portfolio 
strategies in response to  the ex post success of  these different strategies. 
We  view modelling the behavior of speculative prices in such non—tradional 
settings as  a promising avenue for future  research. 
1.  Statistical Power of  Tests for Return Forecastabilit' 
The limited time span of asset return data makes it difficult to detect 
persistent deviations from martingale behavior.  This proposition, stressed by 
2Campbell and Hamao (1989) and Fama and French (1988a) point to 
similar patterns in  the predictable components of  equity markets, the 
former between the U.S. and Japan and the  latter  between industries, as 
evidence that required returns explain these findings. Summers (1986) with respect to first order autocorrelation coefficients, has 
been demonstrated repeatedly even for tests based on  higher order autocorrela— 
tions.3  Not surprisingly, studies of  stock returns have often failed to 
reject the null hypothesis of  serial independence even when  the point es- 
timates suggest substantively important  mean  reversion. 
Studies using broader information  sets than lagged returns have achieved 
more striking rejections of  the null hypothesis that returns are unforecas— 
table.4  These tests use lagged  values of  prices relative to crude fundamen- 
tals, such as constant multiples of  dividends or  earnings, to forecast 
returns.  In this section, we evaluate the power of  these tests as  well as 
traditional autocorrelarion tests for detecting return forecastability. 
1.1  Specification of  the Null and Alternative Hypotheses 
We  consider a simple frsmework in which required returns are constant, 
so that in the absence of  any transitory component in  prices, the ratio of  the 
price to the fundamental  value would be  constant.  Under the null hypothesis, 
asset prices equal their fundamental  value, and thus all movements in  price 
are due to changes in the fundamentsl.  The alternative is that prices contain 
both a transitory and a fundamentsl component.  Since the transitory component 
3Poterba and Summers  (1988)  present evidence on  the low power of 
regression tests and variance ratio tests of  serial dependence in returns. 
Both of  these tests can be expressed as weighted sums of autocorrelations. 
4These studies include Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French 
(1988),  and Barsky and DeLong (1989). decays over time,  prices will  display long run mean  reversion.5  The teat for 
these transitory components is then whether the excess returns implied by mean 
reversion are predictable given lagged information. 
Formally, we  write the model as; 
(1)  pt_p+ut 
(2)  — Ptj ÷ 
(3)  u  — purl + v. 
where p  is the the logarithm of  the real asset price6, p  is the logarithm of 
the fundamental component, which evolves as a random walk, and ut  is the 
transitory component, which follows a first—order  autoregressive process. 
Under  the  null, u=O and returns are white noise.  Under the alternative, as 
Porerba and Summers (1988) show, returns (rt—pt—ptl)  will follow an  ARMA(l,l) 
process and will therefore be  partly forecastable on the basis of  past 
information. 
We assume that the econometrician can observe z, a noisy proxy for the 
asset fundamental; 
(4)  ztp+wt, 
where w  is serially uncorrelated.  The proxy's information content depends on 
the share of  the variation in  (zr_pt) that is due to the transitory component. 
We  parameterize this mm A—a/[o+a].  If  A—l,  then Zr equals  p.  Lower 
values of  A imply less precise information on  the fundamental. 
5The alternative could equally well include changes in required 
returns, with observationally equivalent predictions for the time series 
properties of  ex—post returns (Poterba  and Summers, 1988),  We  consider 
these two explanations for our findings in Section 4. 
6The asset can be thought of as a futures contract with a fundamental 
value equal to termination  value but no  dividends. 6 
We first consider the power of  autocorrelation tests to detect the 
fcrecastsbility of  returns.  The probability limit of  the first order eutocor— 
relation is: 
(5)  plia(p1)  -(l-p)2c/(c + 2(l—p)u). 
The analogous expression for higher order autocorrelations (j>I)  is 
plirnj) 
= pJ*p1ia(p1).  Under the fads alternative (a#O, p>O), autocorrelations at 
all horizons will be negative, reflecting the reversion of  prices to fundaeen— 
tal value.  The autocorrelations become smaller in  absolute value as the 
persistence of the transitory component (p)  increases.  Under the null 
hypothesis (o=O), returns are uncorrelated. 
We consider autocorrelation tests  based on  the first order autocorrela— 
tion coefficient alone, as well as the average of autocorrelations 1—12,  13— 
24,  and 25—36.  The averages allow for the possibility that while any single 
autocorrelation may be difficult to distinguish from zero,  persistent devia- 
tions at all lags should yield more  powerful tests. 
A second strategy is to predict returns using inforsation about the 
relation between price and  the proxy for fundamental value.  To do  this, we 
run regressions of  the form: 
(6)  Pt+k  — t  ak  +  —  + ut+lk 
where Pt÷1Ct is the k—period return  beginning in  period  t+l.  The regression 
specification corresponds to previous studies of  return forecsstsbility.  For 
common stocks, for example, if z  were the logarithm of  the real dividend, 
then zt—pt would equal the log dividend—price ratio and this regression is 
similar to  that in  Campbell and Shiller (1989)  or  Fsma and French (1988b) 
The coefficients are subscripted by  k to reflect the possibility of  estimating 
this equation for a variety of  different return horizons. The probability limit of k  is: 
(7)  plim(Pk) — (l_Pk)A. 
which ia poaitive provided o>O  (ao A>O).  As with  the autocorrelstion 
coefficients, mean—reverting behavior will be difficult to distinguiah from 
random walk  behavior when p ia near unity (the transitory component ia highly 
aerially correlated) ot  when A ia near  zero (little of  the variation in  the 
deviation between fundamental and price is due to  the transitory component). 
The regression specified in (6) could be  estimated using non—overlapping 
k—period observations, but that would not use all of  the information in  the 
data series.  Fully efficient estimation involves estimating (6)  using 
overlapping data.  Since 5t+lk is correlated across observations in this 
case, ordinary least squares standard errors  will be  inconsistent.  We 
therefore apply the technique developed by  Newey and West (1987)  to compute 
consistent standard errors; we  allow for k—l autocorrelations of  the error 
term. 
i.2  Correcting for Small Sample Bias 
gstimates of k' whether based on  overlapping or  non—overlapping data, 
are biased in  small samples.  In a finite data set, above—average returns in 
one period will tend to be  associated with above—average future prices, but 
below—average future returns, since the average return is fixed in the sample. 
This implies a negative correlation between current prices and future returns, 
7Hodrick and Hansen (1989) compare the statistical properties of 
regression tests using multi—period returns as the dependent variable (as 
in (6))  with tests in  which single—period returns are regressed on  the sum 
of lagged  values of  the independent variables (Zr_pt).  Although they  find 
the latter to be  superior, we focus on  equationa like (6)  for compara- 
bility with earlier studies, even  if the series is a  random walk.  Even  when  prices are calibrated relative 
to fundsmental vslues, if fundsmentsl—price ratios that ste below sversge were 
preceeded by  shove—average past returns, they will signal  below—sversge future 
returns.8  Regression evidence will thus indicate thst fundamental—price 
deviations predict future returns, even though the subsequent returns msy he 
independent of  the fundsmental—price ratio.9 
To calibrate the small sample bias we  must specify the process for 
(which we denote  and the effect of  on  In  most  csses  is 
sdequstely described as a first—order autoregression: 
(8)  TMti-l = *tLt + 
In  the model shove, for example, =p*X.  Because positive shocks tc returns 
raise prices and therefore lower ZtPt, the errors in (6)  and (8)  will be 
negatively correlated:  C 0.  We also assume that the current value of  the 
fundamental—price ratio summarizes all the information in  the history of 
and z  which can be  used to  predict returns, so that: 
(9)  lt  + V1. 
Given the correlation between the errors in  (8)  and (9), the errcr in  the 
returns equation may be  written: 
- 
(10)  °t+l  ur5't÷l + 
81n our specification of  the null hypothesis, the fundamental—price 
ratio is independent of past returns, and thus rhere is no  small sample 
hiss.  For alternative specifications of  the null hypothesis, including 
some considered below,  these error terms will be correlated, and there 
will be  small sample bias. 
9Even if all of the readjustment of  the fundamental—price ratio to 
its  average occurs through changes in  the fundamental, which are not a 
component of  returns, knowledge that the fundamental—price ratio is high 
imparts information about past returns, and thus about whether future 
returns will  be  above or  below the sample average. 9 
Equation (9)  doea  imply that returna further in the future cannot be 
forecast using the current value of the fundamental—price ratio.  Rather, it 
suggests that any such predictive power must operate through the correlation 
between current fundamental—price ratios snd future ratios, snd the predictive 
power of future fundamental—price ratios for future returns.  For example, the 
j—period ahesd return can be  related to  by: 
(11)  r+  71/A 
+ 
where 7jl&. 
Since  in equation (6) equslsE  y, the hiss  in  estimst— 
ing k  is found by  computing the hiss for  and summing the results. 
The hiss  calculation for  proceeds as follows: 
T  T 
(12)  S tt÷  / 
t—l  tl 
$l*[S1Pt*Mt+jl  /1t)21 
+ 
T  1' 
— $l*(jl) 
+  S t(nt+  +  / S (p)2 
t=l  t—l 
- $l*jl) 
+  - 
where  j-l 
is the regression estimate of  the (j—l)st  sutocorrelation of 
Recslling that  — fll*31, we  can express the bias of  as: 
(13)  Bias(;) 
- i1) + Pvq*[(j 
-  -  - 
-  - j-l1 +  —  J1 
Adding stross j to form the sum,  we find the bias of 
k  k  k 
(14)  Bias($k) -  BiasNj) 
=  - Puq*)*S[jl -  +  - 10 
+ p*(1_fl*E  [*  - 
We  simplify this expression using s result from Kendell (1973) on  the 
small sample bias in the jth estimsted aurocorrelarion for an  AR(l) process:1° 
(15)  E() 
- f(l$)/(l_*)*(l_#J)  + 2jJ]/ç-j). 
The sum in equation (14)  is then:11 
k—1  I  1$  _k  k—I 
- 
(16)  E[_JJ=____[(___)*(k_l___)+2Ej& 
I 
j=1  T—k  1—  1—  j=1 
1  i+  k  2 
=  —  —— [(—)*(k-I — —) + —*(  (k-l)*)j 
T—k  1—  l—#  1—$  1— 
1  k  k—i  (2k_l)k 
=  - —-  —  - ——-H. 
T—k  l—  l—  l— 
Using  this expression and  (15)  to  simplify  (14)  yields 
k—i  + k* 
—  (2k—l) 
(17)  Bias($k) 
=  —  + p*(l—#)J*{  — 
(I—)*(T—k) 
is  - p,3*[(—)*(l-) 
+ 2kJ/(T-k).  is 
10Equstion  (15) also shows  that our autocorrelsrion coefficients will 
be hissed.  Under the null hypothesis of serial independence, the hiss of 
the j—th order surocorrelstion is just —i/(T—j).  We therefore add l/(T—j) 
to each of our estimsted surocorreistions. 
11Since the biss in any surocorreistion is a function of (T—j),  the 
number of  degrees of freedom for rhsr sutocorrelstion,  hisses for dif- 
ferent surocorrelstions cannot generslly be added.  To form equation (16) 
we  assume that esch sutocorrelsrion has the ssme number of  observations—— 
the fewest number for the set (T—k).  Since we  use only (T—k)  observations 
in our subsequent empiricsl work, each surocorreistion will have only this 
number of  observations. 11 
Equation (17)  gives the small sample bias as a function of  the autocorrelation 
coefficient for (Ztpt), the correlation between the errors in  the return and 
the fundamental—price equations, and the 'true" effect of  the fundamental— 
price deviation on  one—period ahead returns.  To  calculate this bias we 
estimate ,  , and  for each market, and then use the estimated values  in 
(17)  to evaluate the bias.12 
We tested this bias  formula using Monte Carlo simulations of  one period, 
12—period, and 48—period regression coefficients and biases.13  We  chose 
.98, to  match our empirical work, and considered 348 and 180 period samples. 
The results suggest two sources of  inaccuracy.  First, short horizon regres- 
sions are more biased than the theory suggests, while adding together returns 
lowers the bias.  With 348 observations, the one period regression coefficient 
is 18% larger  than the theoretical value,  The 12—period coefficient is only 
il larger than its theoretical  value, however, and the 48—period coefficient 
is 9% below its theoretical value.  With 180 observations, the average 
coefficients for the one and 12—period regressions are 26% and 8% larger than 
the theoretical value, and the 48—period coefficient is 29% below its theoret- 
ical value. 
Second, our procedure for computing the bias underestimates the theoreti— 
cal value, especially at longer horizons,  With  348 observations, our es— 
timates of  the bias are 1%,  10%, and 22% below the theoretical bias.  With 180 
12We estimate  under the null that  so that 
13We generated 20,000 random  normal vectors for u  and r and formed 
returns and fundamental—price ratios assuming p1=0 and p0 <0.  Since 
is just a scale parameter when l=' the results are unafected  by this 
value. 12 
observations, the underestimates are 2%,  17%,  and 37%.  In the 48—period 
regression, this second effect dominates the first, and thus our average 
adjusted coefficients are positive at  all horizons.  In our empirical work 
below, we simulate p—values for '3k to account for these imperfect estimates, 
Equation (17)  suggests rhat the small sample  hiss may be  quite larEe, 
particularly if the fundamental—price ratio is highly autocorrelated.  An 
example is illustrative.  For the long  horizon (1926—1988) US  equity data, the 
ordinary least squares estimates of 
fl,g  and fi1 are  81.45 and 1.43.  The first 
order aurocorrelation of the logarithm of the dividend—price ratio is  .98. 
The regression in equation (10) yields p —97.96. These parameters  imply a 
bias of  14.87, almost one—fifth of the estimated coefficient.  Further, since 
the data series we  consider below have at most 348 monthly observations, 
compared to  756 for rhe long horizon US  data, the biases may be even  more 
severe. 
These findings of  small sample bias are important because they have been 
neglected in  many  previous studies of  return forecastability, such as Campbell 
and Shiller (1989), Fama and French (l988b),  and Hodrick and Hansen  (1989). 
Our results suggest that these findings are far weaker than ordinary inference 
suggests. 
1.3  Monte Carlo Resulta 
For each Monte Carlo experiment, we  draw random normal vectors with  348 
observations for c, g, and  These vectors correspond to twenty—nine years 
of  monthly data.1'4  We form returns and fundamental—price ratios from these 
14We focus on  this relatively abort sample period because it cor- 
responds to the data series we use below. 13 
vectors.  In each experiment, we  define the alternative hypothesis by  choosing 
the autocorrelation of the transitory component (p),  the share of the varia- 
tion in one—period returns which is due to the transitory factor, & 
2(l—p)o/(a+2(l—p)c), and the share of  the variance of  the fundamental—price 
ratio due to the fad (A).  We scale these variances by fixing the variance of 
the fundamental innovation:  We  define a corresponding null hypothesis 
which equates the variance of  returns, and the variance of the fundamental— 
price deviation, to their values under the alternative.  In  each case we  use 
the empirical distribution of  the t—statistic  under the null  to find the 
critical region for a one—sided .05 test. 
Table 1 reports Monte Carlo results on the power of  autocorrelation tests 
(Panel  A) and regression tests (Panel  B) for predicting returns.  The table 
considers four possible stochastic processes for returns, reflecting drfferent 
values of  p and 5.  For the regression tests,  we  also present results for 
proxies with different degrees of  information content.  Since the autocorrela— 
non  tests are independent of the fundamental—price ratio, they are unaffected 
by A. 
Even with relatively noisy proxies, regression tests have significant 
power to detect predictability in returns.  The results for p.98 (implying a 
half—life of  the transitory component of 2.9 years) and 5.  75 (three—quarters 
of  the return variation due to the pricing fad) are the most striking.  In 
this case, regressions using one month returns have a 17.3% chance of  reject— 
15By fixing the variance of the fundamental innovation, we  unavoidab— 
ly change  the variance of  the fundamental—price ratio as we  vary A.  This 
preserves comparability of  our results with those in  Poterba and Summers 
(1988).  An  alternative strategy would be to fix the variance of returns 
and the variance of  the fundamental—price deviation, and to allow S  to 
vary as we change the Monte Carlo specification. 14 
ing the null hypothesis when  one—qusrtet of the variation in  the fundamental— 
ptice proxy is due to the fad, and a 30.5% thance when the share is one—half. 
Longer horizon regressions allow an  even greater chanoe of  rejecting the null 
hypothesis.  The power of  a 48  month regression test is 65.4% vhen  the fad 
accounts for one—quarter of the variance of  the fundamental—price ratio, and 
75.5% when it accounts for one—half.  By  comparison, the most powerful 
autocorrelation test in  this case has a power of  only 9.6%. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of  the t—statistic for j5g under the null 
and alternative, using the case p=.98,  6=25, and A=l.  Each distribution  is 
calculated from 25,000 Monte Carlo replications.  The distribution under the 
null is nearly normal, with  slightly thicker tails than the asymptotic 
distribution.16  The mean  under the alternative, 2.94, is positive and large. 
The extent of  this shift shows the substantial power of  the regression test. 
The distribution under the alternative is also leptokurtotic, however.  The 
2.5% critical values are —1.2 and 8.8.  It is thus inappropriate to consult 
conventional t—tables for evalusting the results of  long horizon regression 
tests.17 
18 Hodrick and Hansen  (1989) report simulations of this regression 
specification with a greater discrepancy  between true and nominal size 
than the simulations reported here.  Unlike our specification, the null 
hypothesis  in their model will have small sample bias.  It is unclear 
whether the discrepancy is due to this or  to other differences in  estima- 
tion. 
17Stock and  Richardson  (1989)  raise a similar point regarding the 
interpretation of  variance ratio statistics. 15 
2.  Autocorrelations of  Asset Returns 
This section presents empirical evidence on the sutocorreistion proper- 
ties of ssset retutns.  Our analysis considers returns from s number of stock, 
bond, commodity, snd foreign exchsnge msrkets sround the world, ss well ss 
from the sarkets for s  vsriety of  real assets.  Analyzing many  markets 
increases the statistical power of  our tests.  In  addition, while risk 
considerations are likely to differ substantially across markets, the various 
markets will share any patterns that are common to  the process of speculation. 
2.1  Asset Returns Data 
Stocks and Bonds: Our stock return data for the period 1960—1985 are 
drawn from Morgan Stanley's Caoital International Peraoectivem (MSCI)J5  For 
each of  the thirteen equity markets in  our sample ——  Australia,  Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,  Japan, Bletherlands,  Sweden, Switzer- 
land, United Kingdom, and United States —  we  calculate  monthly  excess  returns 
Rt  am 





log(P1  t-1 
— log(l+i) 
18The MSCI data span the period 1969—1988.  For the 1960—1969 period, 
we use data  provided by  Ihbotmon Associates. 16 
where j  ,  denotes  the end—of—month price index for country j  P1 
dividend 
psyments19, and i  the monthly short—term nominal interest tate.  We  compute 
multi—period returns by summing the relevant  values.29 
The MSCI price index for each country is a weighted average of  the prices 
for a number of large firms in  the country's equity markets.  These indices 
generally do  not correspond to other published indices, and often include 
shares traded on  several different exchanges.  Our data  on  government bond 
returns are from  Ibbotson Associates World Asset Module.  Short—term yields 
are generally Treasury bill yields, or when those are unavailable, money 
market yields.21  The data  aample  period for each country, for both  bond and 
stock returns, ia shown in  Table Al.  For comparability to earlier studies, we 
also report the results of  autocorrelation tests applied to long tetm U.S. 
historical data, drawn from Ibbotson  Associates (1988), on  equity and bond 
returns. 
Foreian Exchanee:  We  compute the excess return to holding foreign 
currency assuming that investors making such investments hold foreign short— 
term bonds rather than just currency.  This implies that the excess return to 
computes dividend yields as aggregate dividends paid over the 
last twelve months divided by  price at the end of  the reference month. 
For several countries, dividend yields in the early part of  the sample 
appear to reflect actual dividend payments rather than the aum of the 
previous year's payments.  We  adjusted these yields to make them com- 
parable with  the later sample.  Using "retrospective" yields will  lead to 
errors in the measured returns, but these errors are likely to be  smaller 
than those from omitting dividends. 
20Poterba and Summers (1988)  analyzed real (not excess) returns 
excluding dividends and computed from monthly averages of  stock prices as 
reported by the International Monetary Fund. 
21The discount rate is used  as the short—term interest rate for 
Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland. 17 
a U.S. investor holding currency j  is: 




where the first term is the nominal appreciation of  country j's currency 
relative to the dollar during month t.  We  focus on  the returns to investors 
in each of  five countries —  France,  Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States —  from holding the currency of the other four Countries, 
yielding  1.0  bilateral currency returns.  Our sample period for exchange rates 
begins  in l974 since exchange rates were fixed in  earlier years.  Monthly 
exchange rate data are from the International  Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics. 
Commodities:  We define the return to holding gold and silver as the 
change in the logarithm of  end-of--month  closing prices.  This implies an 
excess return of: 
(20)  Rgoldt 
— ].og(l+i) 
We use data from 1974—1988, the period when  gold is actively traded in  a 
speculative market.  We  also study the return to holding other metals, defined 
as the monthly logarithmic difference in  the industrial metals price index 
compiled by  the Commodity Research Bureau for the 1959—1988 period.  The 
components of the index are copper, lead and steel scrap, tin, and zinc. 
Real Assets:  We  analyze returns on  a  variety of fixed assets: houses, 
farms,  and various collectibles.  In most cases, we  measure excess holding 
returns under the assumption that these assets provide no  service flow: 
(21)  Rjt  log(Pt/P1ti) 
— log(l+i) 
This assumption is not strictly correct, and the magnitude of the resulting 
measurement error is likely to vary across markets. 18 
We  use various dare  sources for real asset information.  House prices, 
available quarterly from 1970—86, snd from Case and Shiller  (1989).  These 
dare are constant—quality house price indices  measured for four differenr 
cities.22  The data on  collectibles, annual from 1967—1988, cover oriental 
carpets, stamps, Chinese ceramics, rare books, coins, diamonds, end old master 
paintings.  The data are from Salomon Brothers.  The farm price date are 
annual from 1912—86.  For farms, we were able to  compute a return including a 
crude measure of  rental income, which we  define as  aggregate farm income 
divided by  aggregate farm value.  The capital gain is the change in  average 
farm value per acre.  Thus, our return equation in  this case takes the form: 
(22)  farmt  lcg(Ff  + farm,r 
— log(Pf5g.j) — log(l+ip5) 
where farm,t is imputed per acre farm income.  Data on  average value per acre 
were obtained from the Department of Agriculture (1981 and updates) 
.  Income 
data are from Calling and Irwin (1989). 
2.2  Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on  the means and standard deviations 
of annual returns for the various assets we examine.  The first panel focuses 
on  equity returns and shows substantial disparity in  the mean returns across 
nations.  In  Italy, for example, the excess return on  equities averaged 
negative thirty basis points per year during our sample, while  in four 
countries, the annual excess return exceeds six percent.  Similar, bur less 
221n order to avoid autocorrelation induced  by  measurement error, 
Case and Shiller formed an A and B price index for each city, using 
separate houses in  each index.  Our autocorrelations correlate contem- 
poraneous values of the A series with lags of the B series.  The results 
are very similar when  the two series are reversed. 19 
dramatic, divergence appears for bond  returns. 
Table 2 also shows the correlation between U.S.  dollar returns on 
different classes of assets.  The correlation  between equity and bond  returns 
is  .403.  The foreign exchange portfolio —  a weighted average, using 1975 GNP 
weights, of the returns on the pound, franc,  yen, and mark  —  exhibits a 
correlation of .006  with  US,  equity returns, and its correlation with  U.S. 
bond  returns is .323.  The real assets we  analyze are highly correlated with 
each other, but negatively correlated with many other asset returns.  Gold, 
houses and collectibles all exhibit cross—correlations of  over .45,  but the 
correlation between them and either stocks or bonds is small and negative: — 
059 and  —.164 for gold.  These findings suggest that our analysis of  many 
different assets provides evidence on the  behavior of speculative prices 
beyond  that contained in equity returns. 
2.3  The Characteristic Autocorrelogram of  Speculative Returns 
Tables 3 through 5 present the return autocorrelograms for the various 
assets,  For each asset, we  report the average autocorrelation over eight 
distinct twelve month intervals, beginning with the 1—12 month interval, then 
13—24 months, etc.  We  also report the first order autocorrelation coefficient 
itself.23 
23We choose to study the autocorrelogram rather than the variance 
ratio statistic as in Kim, Nelson, and Startz (1989),  Lo and MacKinlay 
(1989), Poterba and Summers (1988),  and Stock and Richardson (1989).  The 
variance ratio is just a  weighted sum of the autocorrelations.  It is not 
a weighted averase, however, since the sum of the  weights increases with 
the horizon being considered.  Since changes in  variance ratios at 
different horizons therefore do  not shed light on  changes in autocorrela— 
tions over the same horizons, we  prefer to  work  with  the autocorrelations 
themselves. 20 
Table 3 presents the results for stocks and bonds, Table 4 the findings 
for foreign exchange and precious aetals, and Table 5 the findings for real 
assets.  In  cases such as stocks and bonds, where we  analyze data from several 
countries, we  also report the average autocorrelation (and its standard error) 
at each  frequency.  We  compute the variance of  the average using the procedure 
developed in  Poterba and Summers (1988) for estimating the cross—sectional 
dependence of  estimated statistics, thereby recognizing that the estimated 
statistics are not independent across markets.24 
In evaluating the findings in  Tables 3, 4, and  5, it  is useful to recall 
that very  small deviations of  returns from the martingale assumption can imply 
large deviations of  asset prices from fundamental  values.  Summers (1986) and 
Poterba and Summers  (1988)  consider an  example in  which the transitory 
component of  stock prices has a standard deviation of 30 percent, a half life 
of  three years, and accounts for three quarters of  the variance in  stock 
returns.  Nonetheless it induces  only an  expected autocorrelation of —.007 in 
monthly returns. 
The first pervasive characterimtic of  returns in  Tables 3—5 is positive 
serial correlation over horizons shorter than one year.  For most of  the 
assets we  consider, the first order monthly autocorrelstion is positive, and 
the average is usually statistically significant.  The values range from .020 
for gold,  .067  for exchsnge rates,  .101 for common stocks,  .238  for bonds, and 
24If the estimated autocorreistions at  a given lag exhibited s 
constant pairwise correlation ir  across  countries, and if the autocortels— 
tions for esch  country had constant variance 2, then the expected value 
of  the sample cross—sectional variance of these sutocorrelations would be 
o2(1—ir).  Replacing the expected sample  variance with its actual value, we 
estimate ir  as l—s2/u2.  The variance of the sample mean fur N observations 
on  different countries, each with variance 2  but with  cross correlation 
lr,  is then o2(l+(N—l)ir)/N. 21 
.269 for industrial metals.  For silver, the exception to the rule, the serial 
cotrelation coefficient is —.102. 
While some have argued  that non—trading effects may be  relevant in 
assessing findings of  positive aurocorrelation in monthly equity returns, this 
explanation is implausible in  the case of  foreign exchange, gold or  bonds. 
Even in the case of equities, our focus on  monthly data makes non—trading 
unlikely as an  explanation.25 
The estimated monthly autocorrelationa are not only statistically but 
also substantively significant.  They very frequently imply negative expected 
returns.  Consider the following example.  Suppose that in a given market, the 
monthly risk premium is t.  The ex—ante risk premium on an  asset will be 
negative if pl*Rt<p.  For stocks, if one takes the risk premium to be  .7 
parcent per month and the standard deviation of  returns to be 5 percent per 
month  negative expected returnm would be  observed more than 10% of the 
time.26  For bonds, where the standard deviation is only  slightly smaller but 
the risk premium is much  smaller, the calculation is even more dramatic. 
Substantial autocorrelation at short horizons is particularly difficult 
to reconcile with  traditional asset pricing models,  At the monthly frequency, 
the probability of  a negative expected return is (—p/p1e),  where  is the 
distribution function for returns.  As we  expand the return interval, the risk 
premium increases linearly while the standard deviation of returns rises with 
25Lo and MscKinlay (1989a)  find little support for non—trading as the 
explanation of positive autocorrelation in  U.S. equity returns. 
26This calculation assumes that returns are normally distributed. 
The probability of  a negative expected return is t(—p/p1r), where  6'  is the 
standard normal distribution function and a is the standard deviation of 
monthly returns.  Assuming a distribution with thicker tails would 
strengthen our conclusion. 22 
the square root of  the interval length.  For k—period returns, therefore, the 
chsnoe of  a negative expected return ia (—k5p/pc) 
,  where k  is the autocor— 
relation coefficient for this horizon.  The probability of  a negative expected 
return is therefore higher  if a given autocorrelarion coefficient is observed 
at high frequenciea. 
Positive aurocorrelation is not confined to one month returns.  By 
subtracting 1/12 of  the first month's aurocorrelarion from the average 
aurocorrelations over the 1—12 month interval, one finds that average autocor— 
relations between two and twelve  months are positive for all of the asset 
categories.  For equities, the average aurocorrelsrion at one month is  .101 
and the average over the next eleven months is .013.  For bonds, the cor- 
responding values are .238  and .047,  while for foreign exchange the average 
aurocorrelarion at 2—12 months is  .029.  For both stocks and bonds, markers in 
the Unired Stares are less positively autocorrelared than are the other 
markers.27  These findings strengthen earlier results, based largely on  U.S. 
equity returns, of  positive serial correlation at high frequencies.28 
For collectibles, farms, and real estate, data limitations prevent us 
from calculating the monthly return aurocorrelation,  Nevertheless, these 
assets show positive serial correlation in returns at an  annual frequency. 
For house prices, the annual autocorrelation averages .206 for the four cities 
27While we  focus on  bonds of long duration, Gibbons (1989) reports 
positive serial correlation in returns on  short duration, nine— and 
twelve—month U.S. bonds. 
28Porerba and Summers (1988)  find  these patterns using monthly real 
and excess equity returns for the period since 1926.  Lo  and MacKinlay 
(1988) reach similar conclusions using daily dare (and hence focusing on 
shorter time intervals) for the post—1962 period. 23 
in which data are available, while for farm returns (.727) and collectibles 
(.365), the annual autocorrelations are even  larger. 
Tables 3 through 5 also suggest the presence of  negative autocorrelation 
at  longer lags,  though the evidence on this point is less compelling than  that 
for positive high—frequency autocorrelation.  For both  stocks and bonds, the 
average of  the l3th—24th autocorrelations is statistically significantly 
negative.29  The correlation is also negative in  U.S. historical data on 
equity returns.  For bonds, the negative serial correlation persists, with 
negative average autocorrelations at twelve  month windows up to 60 months. 
For exchange rates,  the average autocorrelation in  the second year  is ap- 
proximately equal to its standard error.3°  There is also more pronounced 
evidence of  negative autocorrelation at longer lags,  notably between three and 
four years.  There is little evidence of  negative autocorrelation in the 
returns  to holding mea1s. houses, or  farmland, although Case and Shil].er 
(1990) present evidence that annual real returns in the housing market are 
negatively autocorrelated at  longer horizons.  For collectibles, weak  evidence 
of negative serial correlation emerges at the three year  horizon. 
The pattern of  positive followed by  negative return autocorrelation 
explains why Fama and French (l988a) find that regressing multiperiod stock 
returns on  lagged returns yields stronger rejections of  the null hypothesis of 
29The negative autocorrelations for stocks during the post—1960 
period are noteworthy, since Kim, Nelson and Startz (1989) and others have 
emphasized the sensitivity (noted in  Poterba and Summers (1988)) of 
evidence for mean reversion in  U.S. stock prices to inclusion of  the 
Depression period. 
30me  autocorrelograms estimated here  using excess foreign exchange 
returns look similar to those found by  Huizinga (1986) for real returns. 
This suggests that patterns in  exchange rate movements do not work through 
the effects of  changing interest rates. 24 
serial independence then do variance ratio tests.  The difference between 
these tests is thst the vsriance ratio places declining positivi weight on  all 
sucocortelations up to  a given lag length,  while  the return regressions plsce 
incteesing positive weight on low—order autocorrelations and declining 
positive weight on higher order autocorrelations.  Autocorrelation pstterns 
such as  those in Table 3, which change sign at  different lags, are mote 
difficult to deiect with  a iest like the variance ratio which permits positive 
and negative autocortelationa to cancel each other. 
3.  Predicting Returns Usina Information on  Fundamentals 
The results in the last section suggest that asset returns ate partly 
predictable on the basis of  lagged returns information.  In  this section, we 
examine the extent to which returns over various horizons can be forecast 
using information on  the deviation of price from estimates of  fundamental 
value.  We study returns over both  short horizons —  one  month —— as  well as 
longer  horizons —  12  and 48 monchs —  by estimating regression equations of 
the form: 
(23)  rk  mk  ÷ fik*(zr 
— Pt)  + 
As  in  (6)  above, rrk  is the k—period asset return and (zr—pt) is the dif- 
ference between the logarithm of a  potentially noisy measure of  fundamental 
value and the logarithm of  the asset price. 
We interpret k  as  the fraction of  the deviation from the price fundamen— 
.pgj.  that is eradicated over a k monch horizon.  If  the current market price is 
one percent gjpy the price fundamental z, then returns over the next k 
monchs will  be  higher by .Ol*Pk.  Regressions estimated over various horizons 25 
therefore allow us to  study the speed of adjustment to deviations from  our 
price fundamental. 
To  test the null hypothesis that returns are unpredictable, we compute 
the bias—corrected t—statistic for k  using the Newey—West  (1987)  standard 
error.  As Figure 1 showed, the distribution of  this t—statistjc may be non- 
standard in  small samples, so it  may  be  inappropriate to invoke large sample 
theory for inference.  We thus simulated the t—statistic under an explicit 
null hypothesis, and used the resulting distribution to find  empirical p— 
values. 
We  use a similar, but more general, version of  the null hypothesis from 
our power calculations.  The model there restricted the link between fundamen- 
tal—price ratios and returns to operate through the transitory component of 
prices.  Under the null hypothesis, innovations in  the fundamental—price ratio 
and returns were uncorrelated, and there was no  small sample bias.  We now 
relax this restriction, allowing returns to be correlated with  innovations in 
the fundamental—price ratio, but maintaining that fundamental—price ratios 
have no true predictive power for returns.  The null specification is thus: 
(24)  r+l  — 
(25)  t+l  —  ÷ 
(26)  Ut÷l —  *9t+l + 
By  comparison, in  Section 1 we  assumed that p07—O.  We use the values of  and 
p,  given by the  US data31, and simulate 10,000 values of the t—statistics. 
31For the equity and bond  markets, and the metal index, we use the 
values of p and p  given by the US data from 1960—88.  For the exchange 
rates, gold, and silver, we use the average values of p and p  for the 
four currencies against the dollar.  The long horizon equities and bond 
data use the values from the long horizon U.S. equities. 26 
We then calculate the p—value for each market.  The p—values for the average 
acroaa marketa are found from the aame diatribution, after computing the 
implied atandard error for the average.32 
3.1  Meaauring Price Fundamentals 
For many aaaeta, our measurea of  fundamentala are likely to he  quite 
impreciae.  This biases our teats azainat finding that the divergence between 
price and the measured fundamental  can forecast returns, since it  amounts to 
increasing the variance of wt in  z—p.  Nevertheless, under the null hypothe-. 
sia that asset returns are unpredictable using lagged information, none of  out 
variables should exhibit any forecast power. 
For equity returns, the measure of  fundamental ia a constant multiple of 
the real dividend.  We  then construct the logarithmic difference of  this 
fundamental value and the price, so  our regression relates ex—poat returns to 
the logarithm of  the dividend—price ratio.  In  the bond  market, the efficient 
markets hypothesis and the assumption of a constant risk premium impliea that 
the long term interest rate is a weighted average of  expected future short 
term rates, with weights which depend on  the atochaatic properties of  short 
rates.33  If  short rates are a  random walk, however, the long rate should 
equal the short tate,  and the fundamental  value of  the long term bond  is 
therefore the reciprocal of  the short rate.  Since the actual price of  the 
long—term bond is the reciprocal of  the long rate, we  define ZtPt for bonds 
32We assume that the theoretical  variance of  the coefficient is the 
average estimated variance for the different markets and use the procedure 
detailed in footnote 24. 
33Shillet (1979) is one of  many  studies which presents this linearir— 
ation and teats the associated model of the term structure, 
- 27 
as  the  logarithm of the long term interest tate minus the logarithm of  the 
short term interest rate.  Regressing long—term bond returns on  this variable 
is closely related to previous term structure equations, for example Shiller, 
Campbell, and Schoenholti (1983) and Mankiw and Summers (1984),  which have 
regressed ex—post returns on  the difference between the levels of the long and 
short term interest rates, 
Measuring the exchange rate fundamental is more difficult then defining 
the fundamental for either stocks or bonds.  The fundamental  value of the 
exchange rate depends on the long run real exchange rate at which a sus- 
tainable trade balance can be achieved  Rather than attempting to model 
changes in terms of trade, we  simply assume that the real exchange rate 
consistent with long—run trade balance  (zr)  is a constant.  The logarithmic 
difference between the  fundamental end the current exchange rate is therefore 
just minus the lugarithm of the real exchange rate.  We  use the same approach 
with the metals, postulating that the fundamental is a constant, so  that the 
price deviation is minus the logarithm of  the real price.34 
3.2  Empirical Findings 
Table 6  presents evidence on the forecast power of  differences between 
fundamentals and prices in  world equity markets.  The table reports regression 
results for three return intervals: k — one  month, twelve months, and forty— 
eight months.  The regression coefficients for each horizon are bias—adjusted 
34We also experimented with allowing the fundamental value for 
equities, exchange rates, and metals to vary with  the long term reel 
interest rate.  The qualitative conclusions  were similar to those we 
report below, although this modification typically raised the standard 
errors of  our estimated coefficients, thereby lowering the statistical 
confidence of  our findings. 28 
using the ptocedure described above.  The value in  parentheses beneath each 
coefficient is the Newey—West (1987)  standard error, allowing for autocortela— 
tion at  up to k—l lags.  In  light of  the non—standard shape of  the t—diatribu— 
tion as reported above, we  also report (in  brackets) the percentage of  the 
disttibution of  t—statistics  which lies gpyg the reported value.  Thus, for 
the Australian stock market, where the coefficient (2.30) is reported in the 
first row  of  column 1, the standard error of  1.74 implies  a t—statistic of 
1.32.  Only  10% of  the estimated t—valuea in our Monte Carlo analysis were 
greater than this value. 
The results on  the forecastability of  monthly returns are relatively 
wesk.  The estimated coefficient on ZtPt  has a p—value less than .10 for only 
three of  the thirteen countries, although the cross—country average (reported 
in the penultimate row) has a  p—value of .07.  The point estimates, however, 
suggest substantively important links between the dividend—price ratio and 
subsequent returns.  The average  value of l' 0.75, implies that the ex—ante 
risk premium is negative whenever dividend yields are less than approximately 
forty percent below their average  value.  The average 1  also suggests that 
about three—quarters of  one percent of  any deviation between the current price 
and our dividend—based price fundamental is corrected in  the first month after 
such a deviation appears. 
The center columns in Table 4 report regressions for twelve  month 
returns.  The pattern of coefficients is similar to the one month returns.  In 
four of  the thirteen countries, the coefficient has a  p—values less than .10; 
the p—value for the average, however, is  .03.  The most notable outlier  is 
Japan, where the coefficient is negative and  statistically significant.  For 
the  United  States, where for comparative  purposes the last row in the table 29 
reports the long—horizon (1926—1988) results, the forecast power of the 
dividend—price ratio appears smaller in recent years. 
On average, approximately fifteen percent of  a deviation from the price 
fundamental is erased over the subsequent year.  Since the average value of 
l2 is about seventeen times the average for l' the evidence suggests that 
the dividend—price ratio's forecast power for one period returns grows 
slightly as the horizon grows.  More importantly, however, since twelve month 
returns aggregate many consecutive one—period returns, each of which is partly 
forecastable, the twelve month return regressions yield much clearer evidence 
on  the link between the dividend—price ratio and subsequent returns. 
The final columns present evidence for 48—month returns.  Although the 
sample size for these regressions is limited, the results provide strong 
evidence on the predictive power of dividend—price ratios.  The average 
correction to deviations between the current price and our simple measure of 
fundamentals is forty—one percent over a four year horizon.  This estimate has 
a p—value of .06,  These results suggest that dividend—price ratios exhibit 
substantial forecast power for long term excess retutna, confirming earlier 
findings based on  U.S. time series data. 
The statistical confidence of these results are nevertheless much weaker 
than might have  been expected in light of earlier findings for the United 
States.  This is due to  three factota.  First,  the corrections we make for 
small sample bias significantly reduce the average regression coefficients. 
Table 7  illustrates the detailed bias correction for the case of  48—month 
return regressions.  The average biam for the 13 countries is 26.67.  This 
correction, which has not been used in many prior studies, is of first—order 
importance.  Second, taking account of  the leptokurtotic distribution of the 30 
t—statistic under the null hypothesis reduces substantially the confidence 
associated with  any given t—statistic.  For the 348 month sample, the .05 
cutoff in  rhe 48—month regression t—statistic is 4.02, much  larger than the 
asymptotic value, which previous studies  hsve  used.  Finally, it appears that 
the ordinary least squares regression relation between future returns and  past 
values of  the dividend—price ratio is weaker in recent years. 
We now consider the forecastability of  returns in the bond  market. 
Regressions relating multi—month excess returns on long—term bonds to lagged 
values of  the long—short yield differential are reported in Table 8.  The 
results are less consistent than those from the equity markets and provide 
weaker evidence on  the forecast power of fundamental—price deviations.  For 
one month returns, the yield spread has statistically significant explanatory 
power in  five of  the thirteen bond markets  we  consider, and the cross—country 
averaga  ia  also statistically significant.  The coefficient implies about the 
-same amount of  mean reversion as for the equity market: eight—tenths of  one 
percent of a fundamental—price disparity is corrected over a one month 
hotizon. 
At  the 12—month horizon, only  two  of  the thirteen countries evidence 
statistically significant links between yield differentials and subsequent 
returns on  long bonds, and the average is quite low.  At  longer horizons, as 
the column for 48—month returns shows,  the standard errors on  the estimated 
coefficients increase and it  betomea difficult to draw any conclusions.  Most 
of  the long—horizon coefficients are negative, contrary to the prediction of 
our earlier analysis that high  prices relative to fundamentals should signal 
lower aubsequent returns.  None of the findings are precise enough, however, 
to reject the null hypothesis that long—horizon bond returns are not forecas— 31 
table.  In conttaat, the resulta for the U.S. bond returns in the laat tow of 
Table 8 suggest substantial return forecast power, but with  only about six 
percent of  fundaaental—price deviations corrected over 48  month horizons. 
Table 9 presents the results of  relating currency returns to  the devia- 
tion  between real exchange rates and our estimate of their fundamental value. 
These results also suggest little evidence for the predictability of returns. 
While some of the point estimates, notably for the US, Japan, and the UK, are 
quite large, most of  the coefficients are small end have large standard 
errors.  The average correction is only 9 percent after one year, and thirty— 
one percent after four years, borh with very large standard errors.  Although 
the results are weak, this is partly the result of  the small samples we 
analyze for exchange rates.  These samples make the small sample  bias very 
large (on average 59.32), and also require large t—ststistics to reject the 
null.  The .05  cutoff in the distribution of  the null, foc example, is 7.08. 
Table 10 presents results for commodity metels.  Once sgsin the point 
estimates suggest that low fundamental—prices signal low subsequent returns, 
but the ststisticsl confidence of these results is low.  For both  gold and 
silver, the estimated coefficients on 48—month returns imply that deviations 
between prices sod fundamental  values are more then eradicated over this 
interval.  Although the t—stetistics in  each case are well shove three, the 
skewed nature of the distribution for this statistic renders the associated p— 
vslues only .22 (silver) sod .06  (gold). 
Given the smell ssmples for the real essets, we do  not estimate equations 
like (6)  for these sssets.  Gsee end Shiller (1990), however, report evidence 
that rental—to—price ratios positively predict future returns in the cities 
for which they have  dare,  If  the discount rste is constant, the rental—to— 32 
price ratio can be interpreted aa a constant multiple of  the fundaaental—price 
ratio. 
Our results on  the predictive power of deviations between actual prices 
and plausible measures of  price fundamentals,  while weak, suggest that earlier 
findings that the dividend—price ratio forecasts stock returns in the U.S. are 
psrt of m  more general pattern across equity  markets.  For all the assets 
except bonds,  the point estimates suggest at  least 30 to 40  percent mean 
reversion over a four year  interval.  For most markets other than equities, 
however, the brevity of our sample makes the resulting estimates imprecise. 
The pattern of  both  positive autocorrelation and reversion to iundamen— 
tsls documented in  this and the previous section is consistent with Frankel 
and Froot's (1987)  survey evidence on  foreign exchange market expectations. 
They find  that traders have extrapolative short run expectations, reflecting a 
belief that trends  persist, but long run expectations based on  fundamentals. 
This pattern is rational if  excess returns on  currencies exhibit positive 
short term and negative long term autocorrelarion.  It is also the premise of 
technical strategies which seek to catch trends in short—term investing, as 
well as  long—run "value investing" strategies of  the type advocated by  Graham 
and Dodd  (1934).  The remainder of this paper considers two alternative 
explanations, one based on  time—varying risk factors and the other on the 
dynamics of  speculative trading, which might explain these empirical regulari- 
ties. 33 
4.  Alternative Explanations for these Patterns 
One explanation of the stylized patterns in  asset returns is that they 
are caused by  changes in risk factors over time.  Such an argument is dif- 
ficult to rule out, since any failure of an  asset pricing model can always be 
attributed to the  sismeasurement of risk,  Changing required returns appear 
unlikely, however, to explain our empirical findings. 
First,  traditional models in financial economics have difficulty justify- 
ing substantial risk presia, let alone substantial variation in these risk 
premia.  Mehra and Prescott (1985)  show that the average excess return on  the 
U.S. stock market since 1926 is too large to  be consistent with  plausible 
estimates of  risk aversion and the observed riskiness of stock returns, 
Frankel  (1985,  1986) argues that risk presia of  more a few basis points are 
not supported by  standard capital asset pricing models.35  Yet, as our 
foregoing results sugge&t  positive autocorrelation in returns implies large 
swings in  ex—ante returns. 
Second, changing risk factors would not naturally produce the observed 
autocorrelation patterns, particularly positive autocorrelation at high 
frequencies.6  One would expect increases in risk that raise future ex—ante 
returns to be  capitalized into a current negative excess return.  For simple 
specifications of the risk process, this would would lead to negative autocor— 
35Friedman (1985)  shows that under standard capital asset pricing 
models, the equity premium observed during this period is enough to sake 
investors almost wholly concentrate in  equity securities. 
36Marcus (1989) and Cecchetti, Lam and Mark  (1989)  among others argue 
that changes in stock prices change the wealth of investors, affecting 
their risk aversion and thus expected returns.  Whatever the merits of 
this argument in the case of  stocks, it is much less likely to apply in 
the case of inside assets like bonds, or assets like gold and metals that 
comprise only a small fraction of  the representative investors' portfolio. 34 
relation at high  frequencies.  While it is possible to generate processes for 
risk fsctots which ate consistent with the observed sutocorrelation in 
returns, as for example in  Poterbs and Summers (1988, footnote 27),  they do 
not agree with  the processes suggestkd by  empitical work  on  the evolution of 
volatility.37 
Third, since returns on  the various assets analyzed in the last section 
are only  weakly correlated, it is unlikely that a single risk—factor could 
account for the statistical regularities in all markets.  Soae assets are 
affected primarily by  nominal factors while others are influenced primarily hy 
real factors; some represent large shares of investors' wealth while others 
represent small shares; some yield variable cash flows while others are a 
source of  stable income; some have finite  horizons while others do not.  it 
would be remarkable if  a common risk factor could account for the common 
patterns in returns on  all assets.38  Indeed, it is not even clear how risk 
should affect all the assets we  analyze.  In  the case of  foreign exchange, for 
example, risk affects both currencies being exchanged, and so does not even 
have a predictable effect on  the level of  exchange rates.39 
37poterba and Summers (1986)  and French, Sohwert, and Stambaugh 
(1987)  find that volatility exhibits substantial positive autocorrelation, 
with little evidence of  the complex dynamics needed to explain positive 
followed by  negative autooorrelation in  returns. 
38Fot equities, changes in dividends may precede increases in  risk 
premia and lead to the  appearance of  spurious positive autocortelation in 
ax—post returns.  Even if this  were correct, it is difficult to see how 
analogous explanations could operate in the case of  gold,  long—term bonds, 
or foreign exchange. 
39'rheories  of  exchange rate determination that rely on  asset sub- 
stitutability, for example, imply that the effect of  exchange tate risk 
will depend on the relative supplies of  assets across countries and 
savings propensities in different countries, variables which are likely to 
change over time. 35 
A fourth difficulty with  the required returns explanation is the weak 
empirical association between varistions in  ex—post returns and changes in 
measurable aspects of  risk,  Campbell and Shiller  (1989)  find  that while 
dividend yields have predictive power for subsequent dividend growth in  long 
period U.S. dsrs, they do not have predictive power for interest rates or 
other determinsnts of  risk premia.  Cutler, Porerba and  Summers  (1989)  have 
trouble explaining more than  half of  the vsristion in  U.S. stock returns on 
the basis of  news, even after controlling for changes in volatility.  Meese 
snd Rogoff (1983) report similar findings in their study of  the foreign 
exchange marker. 
As further evidence on this point, Table II  augments our estimates of  the 
link between equity returns and fundamental—price devistions, presented in 
Table 6,  to include a measure of marker volatility.  We  define volatility as 
the logsr±tiim  of  the sum of squared monthly returns over the previous year.4° 
If  part of the dividend yield's explanatory power srises from its proxy role 
for risk factors such as volatility, adding volatility to the equation should 
reduce the coefficients on  the log dividend—price rstio.41 
also used  volatility messures over longer horizons without 
finding any differences. 
41The bias calculation derailed above extends easily to multivariste 
regression.  In  the system 
rr÷l  xt*bi + ut+l, 
Xt÷l  xt*A  +  and 
ut+l — vt+l*puv + et+l. 
where x=lxk, b1=kxl, Akxk, v+1lxk, and puykxl, the bias is: 
biss(b1) — [(xt'xt)(xt'xt+l) 
— AJPuv. 
If, further, A is assumed disgonsl, this reduces to  s series of univsriste 
biases, which may be summed as  before to produce the k—period bias.  Since 
the sversge correlation across the 13 equity markets between the innova— 36 
The results provide little suppott for the conjecture that risk factors 
explain the link between fundamental—price deviations and subsequent rerutns. 
The coefficient on  the logarithm of  the dividend—price ratio is virtually 
unaffected by  the inclusion of  volatility.  In  the 48—month regression, for 
example, the average coefficient on  the price deviation is 51.6, compared to 
41.2 for the equation without the control for  volatility.  Further, while 
volatility generally has a positive effect on  subsequent returns, it is often 
quite small.  This increase in the average  coefficient is the opposite of  what 
would be  predicted if the relationship  were  due solely to omitted risk 
factors.  In  that case, controlling for risk should reduce k  We have also 
tried including real interest rates and other proxies for risk factors in the 
equations, with results similar to those for volatility. 
5.  Conclusions 
Cur empirical results suggest thdee stylized facts about speculative 
returns.  First, returns tend to  be  positively serially correlated at  high 
frequency.  Second, returns tend to be (weakly) negatively serially correlated 
over long horizons.  Third, deviations of  asset values from proxies for 
fundamental  value have predictive power for excess returns,  These patterns 
appear difficult to explain on  the basis of  time—varying required returns,  in 
contrast, the similarity of  these patterns in  a wide range of  asset markets 
suggest the possibility that they are best explicable as a  consequence of  the 
speculative  process itself. 
non  in  the logarithm of  dividend yields and the innovation in  the 
logarithm of  volatility is  .028,  this seems appropriate. 37 
Research directed at formalizing the dynamics of  speculative markets is 
just beginning.  One strand of research, for example Kyle (1985) and Black 
(1986),  has considered the role of  heterogeneoum investor information in 
accounting for asset price movements.  A aeoond research program, typified by 
Shiller  (1984)  and DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), has 
modelled asset market equilibrium when  some investors are uninformed but 
engage in transactions  nonetheless.  Such "noise traders" may cauae prices to 
deviate from fundamental values.  Finally, a third line of  research tries to 
formalize the role of  "hiatory—baaed trading."  In Cutler, Poterba and Summers 
(1990)  we  outline a model of maser market equilibrium in  which  interactions 
between rational investors, who base demand on expected future returns, and 
backward—looking  traders, can produce the stylized facts we  document here.  We 
consider two types of backward—looking inveatora; fundamentals traders, who 
look at prices relative to perceived fundamentals, following strategies 
advocated by, for example, Craham and Dodd (1934); and feedback traders, who 
base  demand on past returns.  Feedback trading  would result, for example, from 
portfolio insurance or margin—call induced selling, and ham been  highlighted 
by  Kindleberger (1978) in his analysis of  speculative bubbles. 
In  this framework, positive short run serial correlation of returns can 
result if some fundamentals traders lesrn news only with a lag, or if aome 
feedback traders "lean into the wind" to prevent price movements, am  central 
banks do in the foreign exchange market.  Positive feedback traders who 
reapond to such positive autocorrelation and who base their demand on past 
returns can generate the pattern of  positive and negative autocorrelation seen 
in  the data.  By prolonging the impart of  fundamental news, positive feedback 
traderm can lengthen the horizon oved  which returns are positively aerially 38 
correlated.  They may also cause prices to over—shoot their long run value, 
however, thus inducing negative serisl correlation at  some horizon.  This 
overshooting also causes the deviation of  price and fundamental value to 
predict subsequent returns. 
Further research is needed  to explore models of  speculation.  Leland 
(1.987)  argues that if positive feedback trading becomes sufficiently impor- 
tant, it is possible for the market to have multiple equilibria, ao  that 
discontinuous responses of prices to fundamentals are possible.  The effecc of 
learning, with traders switching to trading strategies which have been 
profitable, could generate important new dynamics in these models.  Perhaps 
the greatest need, however, is to develop testable implications of  these 
models.  It  may be  possible to make predictions, for example, about the amount 
of positive feedback trading and market volatility,  volume, or  other observ- 
able market characteristics.  Sumh  testable predictions are vital if  the 
literature on  alternatives to traditional  asset pricing models is to advance 
beyond the realm of  speculation. References 
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.  August  1981 (and  unpublished updates). Table 1:  Power of  Autocorrelation and R  egression Tests 
p=.9g 
Return Protess Parameters 
p=.98  p=.99  p=.99 
Horizon  8=.  25  8=.  75  8=.  25  5=.  75 
A.  Autocortelation Tests 
1  Month  .056  .068  .054  .060 
1—12 Month Average  .064  .096  .057  .069 
13—24 Month Average  .064  .077  .061  .067 
25—36 Month Average  .O5  .062  .058  .059 
B. Regression Tests 
Proxy Signal/Variance Ratio  .01 
1 Month  .057  .064  .053  .057 
12 Month  .087  .121  .072  .007 
48 Month  .006  .149  .087  .116 
Proxy Signal/Variante Ratio  .25 
1  Month  .106  .173  .085  .120 
12 Month  .279  .570  .214  .309 
48 Month  .316  .654  .283  .538 
Proxy Signal/Variance Ratio  .50 
1 Month  .168  .305  .130  .202 
12 Month  .380  .732  .305  .661 
48 Month  .402  .755  .366  .673 
Proxy Signal/Variance Ratio = 1.00 
1 Month  .189  .341  .129  .201 
12 Month  .306  .529  .236  .354 
08 Month  .363  .621  .325  .486 
Panel A shows the empirical power of a one—tail autotorrelation test,  and Panel B shovs 
the eapirical power of  a one—tsil regression test,  both with size=.05.  The critical 
values are found from the distribution of the test statistic under the null.  Each 
simulation draws 348 observations for the null and alternative.  Panel A is based on 
20,000 simulation; Panel B is based on  5,000 simulations. Table 2:  Summary Statistics for Market Returns 
A. Equity and Bond Markets 
Excess Return (Relative to Short Term Yield) 
Long Term 
Equity  Government Bond 
(1960—1988)  (1960—1988) 
Country  Mean  Std Devu  Mean  Std Devn 
Australi  1.27  26.17  —2.12  9.78 
Austria  1.60  12.70  3,72  4.06 
Belgium  7.91  16.55  —0.33  4.58 
Canada  2.29  18.55  —0.17  7.22 
France  1.04  20.86  —0.46  5.92 
Germany  2.76  17.98  2,13  5.09 
Italy  —0.31  23.40  0.03  7.56 
Japan  7.11  16.83  0.96  5.00 
Netherlands  6.59  17.51  1.74  6.27 
Sweden  6.38  18,43  —1.20  5.68 
Switzerland  2.58  17.24  1.80  4.51 
United Kingdom  3.87  22.28  —0,27  10.55 
United States  2.62  15.18  —0.45  10.05 
B. Alternative Assets 
Currency  Gold  Silver  Metals  Houses  Farms  Collectibles 
Mean  2.19  —0.81  —5.20  —1.57  0.37  3.29  4.35 
Std Devn  10.16  25.27  48.93  14.11  3.27  9.13  12.32 
C.  Correlations for Annual U.S.  Dollar Returns 
US  Equities  US Bonds  Currpnc  Gold  Houses  Collectibles 
US Equities  1.000 
US Bonds  .403  1.000 
Currency  .004  .323  1.000 
Gold  —.059  —.164  .425  1.000 
Houses  —.036  —.144  .566  .566  1.000 
Collectibles  .306  —.084  .300  .458  .821  1.000 
Note:  Equity and government bond  returns are in own currency and are relative to the 
short term yield.  The correlation matrix uses data for the United States only.  The 
currency return is the weighted average dollar excess return to holding the Pound, 
Mark, Yen and Franc, where the weights are 1975 GNP (in dollars).  Appendix Table A—I 
contains the sample period for the equity and bond market returns.  Currency, gold and 
silver returns are from 1974—1988.  Industrial metals returns are from 1959—199.  House 
returns ate from 1970—1986.  Farm returns are from 1912—1986.  Collectibles returns are 
from 1968—1988, and average the returns of  the available assets each year.  The sample 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































,Table 5; Autocorrelations for Alternative Assets 
Autoc  orre  lation 
Asset  1 Year  2 Year  3 Year  Observations 
House Prices —  Average  .206  .083  .053 
.032)  (.033)  (.062) 
Atlanta  .062  .034  .009  65 
Chicago  .391  .185  .081  65 
Dallas  .129  .036  .063  65 
San Francisco  .243  .075  .058  66 
Penn Prices  727  .442  .306  76 
.116)  (.118)  (.120) 
Collectables — Average  .365  .011  —.103 
(.160)  (.153)  (.152) 
Oriental Carpets  .725  .163  —.105  11 
(.316)  (.333)  (.354) 
Stamps  .573  .324  .105  20 
(.229)  (.236)  (.243) 
Chinese Ceramics  .116  —.182  —.183  21 
(.224)  (.229)  (.236) 
Rare Books  —.070  —.115  .159  13 
(.289)  (.302)  (.316) 
Coins  .242  —.056  —.091  21 
(.224)  (.229)  (.236) 
Diamonds  .515  —.050  —.239  21 
(.224)  (.229)  (.236) 
Old Hester Paintings  .456  —.007  —.364  21 
(.224)  (.229)  (.236) 
Each entry reports the autocorrelation for the year  indicated.  House price data are 
quarterly from 1970:1 to 1986:2 (1986:3  for San Francisco); see Shiller and Case (1987) 
for a description.  Farm price data are annual from 1912—1986; the capital gain is from 
Department of Agriculture  (1988);  dividend income is from Colling and Irwin (1989). 
Data on other assets are annual from 1967 or later and were supplied by Salomon 
Brothers.  The standard errors for the averages take account of the  cross correlation 
between  assets,  For the collectibles, the theoretical standard deviation is assumed to 




























Rtk  = 
01<  + $k*(Ztpt) + °tk 
85.07  [0.01] 
(11.62) 
—.002  35.25  [0.41] 
(56.08) 
.015  26.04  [0.37] 
(31.47) 
.132  43.91  [0.14] 
(16.65) 
.101  45.42  10131 
(17.80) 
.091  40.60  10.211 
(21.54) 
.063  5.20  10.51] 
(40.33) 
.034  —56.71  [0.90] 
(24.22) 
.089  71.09  [0.10] 
(24.46) 
.083  51.64  [0.29] 
(40.52) 
.122  73.58  [0.17] 
(33.52) 
.268  94.39  [0.02] 
(17.98) 
.080  20.06  [0.35] 
(21.17) 
41.20  [0.061 
(10.87) 
.077  66.58  [0.01] 
(14.45) 
the regression: 
where z..  is the logarithm of the real dividend.  Data  are from 1960—1988; see Appendix 
Table Al for specifics.  The coefficients are bias—adjusted.  Numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors, calculated using the Newey—West procedure.  The standard error of 
the average accounts for cross correlation of the coefficients, as in the text. Number 
in brackets are p—values for the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero,  based o 
the Monte Carlo distribution of the adjusted t—statistic. 
1 Month 
Country  l  p—value  2 
12  Month 
12  p—value  2 
48 Month 
p—value  2 















Ave  rage 
US 
1926—1988 
2.30  [0.10]  .014 
(1.74) 
—1.69  [0.95]  .004 
(0.90) 
—0.62  [0.711  —.004 
(0.91) 
1.30  [0.23]  .004 
(1.81) 
0.48  [0.28]  .005 
(0.86) 
—0.04  [0.50]  .000 
(1.03) 
0.59  [0.31]  —.001 
(1.21) 
—1.10  [0.99]  .002 
(0.41) 
0.46  [0.36]  .002 
(1.29) 
—0.23  [0.57]  -.002 
(0.97) 
2.70  [0.06]  .014 
(1.64) 
5.11  [0.01]  .018 
(1.62) 
0.54  [0.29]  .002 
(1.00) 




























.296  0.01  [0.47]  .003  17.44  [0.06] 
(0.78)  (8.46) 
Each entry reports estimates of  the coefficient '1k  from Table 7: Calculation of  Small Sample Bias for Equity Markets 




p7  Bias 
Australia  10332  3.60  0.95  —7887  1824 
Austria  7585  —0.95  0.98  —54.67  40.59 
Belgium  66.73  0.54  0.98  —73.62  40.69 
Canada  72.45  2.75  0.96  —93.08  28,54 
France  71.94  1.50  0.98  —81.85  26,52 
Germany  71.17  0.95  0.98  —87.al  30.58 
Italy  20.52  1.27  0.96  —52.56  15.32 
Japan  —18.03  —0.41  1.00  —60.30  38.68 
Netherlands  101.91  1.71  0.97  —85.20  30.82 
Sweden  85.41  0.78  0.99  —77.33  33.77 
Switzerland  85,08  3.62  0.94  —71,79  11.50 
United Kingdom  107,44  4.28  0.96  —90.62  13.05 
United States  38,43  1,27  0.97  —64.94  18.37 
United States  81.45  1.43  0.98  —97.96  14.87 
The table show the components of the small sample bias for 48—month dividend—price 
ratio regressions.  /543  is the unadjusted 48—month regression coefficient.  p and 
are the estimated coefficients for that country.  The final column shows the bias 
estimate, Table 8: Forecasting Long—Term Excess  Holding Returns With  Yield Spreads 
Each entry reports estimates of the coefficient 1k  from the regression: 
Rtk  °k  + kk(zt—pt) + 
where z  is the logarithm of  the reciprocal of  the short term interest rate.  Data are 
from 1960—1988; see Appendix Table Al for specifics.  The coefficients are bias— 
adjusted.  Numbers in  parentheses are standard errors, calculated using the Newey—West 
procedure.  The standard error of the average accounts for cross correlation of the 
coefficients. Numbers in brackets are p—values for the null hypothesis  that the 
coefficient is zero, based on the Monte Carlo distribution of  the adjusted t—statistic 
1 Month  — 
Country  l  p—value  K2 
12  Month —  48  Month 
l2  p—value  R2 
[0.66]  .009 
48  p—value  2 
Australia  0.11 
(1.17) 




10,69]  .029 
Austria  1.33 
(0.55) 
[0.01]  .023  3.27 
(9.16) 
[0.41]  —.002  3.03 
(17.16) 
[0.50]  —.004 
Belgium  3.40 
(1.04) 
[0.01]  .036  25.82 
(12.64) 
[0.10]  .061  43.04 
(53.00) 
[0.37]  .020 
Canada  0.65 
(0.49) 
[0.10]  .002  3.96 
(4.68) 
[0.29]  .007  —3.22 
(12.13) 
[0.59]  .006 
France  2.10 
(0.53) 
[0.00]  .042  3.07 
(5.92) 
[0.37]  —.001  —9.26 
(10.53) 
[0.71]  .015 
Germany  —0.05 
(0.17) 
[0.58]  —.003  —1.65 
(1.82) 
[0.73]  .007  —5.87 
(3.95) 
[0.81]  .031 
Italy  0.43 
(0.39) 
[0.131  .003  —0.24 
(6.58) 
[0.52]  —.003  —20.16 
(26.95) 
[0.69]  043 
Japan  0.76 
(0.45) 
[0.05]  .011  —0.11 
(5.46) 
[0.51]  —.004  —17,19 
(11.63) 
[0.81]  .092 
Netherlands  0.07 
(0.31) 
[0.40]  —.003  —2.99 
(3.22) 
[0.73]  .019  —13.63 
(6.03) 
[0.89]  .125 
Sweden  0.44 
(0.31) 
[0.09]  .002  —0.84 
(2.65) 
[0.59]  .001  —10.01 
(3.78) 
[0.921  .226 
Switzerland  0.22 
(0.24) 
[0.181  —.001  —1.28 
(3.79) 
[0.59]  .002  —12.52 
(3.66) 





[0.54] —.003  —2.33 
(6.32) 
[0.60]  —.002  —53.98 
(22.00) 





[0.021  .012  15.41 
(6.00) 
[0.05]  .081  —6.49 
(16.52) 
[0.62]  .004 
Average  0.85 
(0.29) 
[0.01]  2.65 
(2.44) 







[0.16]  .004  1,62 
(0.45) 
[0.01]  .055  5.57 
(1.63) 
[0.04]  .124 Table 9:  Forecasting Excess Foreign Holding Returns Using Real Exchange Rates 
1 Month 
Country  p—value  2 
12 Month 
l2  p—value  2 
48 Month 
48  p—value  R2 
United States 
France  —0.98  [0.80)  .003  —1,88  [0.59]  .129  34.43  [0.49)  .455 
(1.03)  (14.21)  (34.94) 
Germany  —1.44  [0.88)  —.002  —9.44  [0.70)  .071  —9.32  [0.67)  .252 
(1.03)  (14.10)  (33.66) 
Japan  0.58  [0.40)  .007  29.72  [0.28]  .212  150.63  [0.01)  .715 
(1.79)  (21.58)  (13.82) 
United  0.61  [0.35)  .019  18.74  [0,27)  .272  122.56  [0.06)  .813 
Kingdom  (1,28)  (13.17)  (19.17) 
fl 
France  —1.29  [0.78)  —.003  —0.17  [0.56)  .111  —28.81  [0.77)  .286 
(1.16)  (10.86)  (24.39) 
Germany  —1.64  [0.83]  —.004  —8.97  [0.74)  .051  —67.42  10.91]  .024 
(1.15)  (10.31)  (20.32) 
United  0.22  [0.53)  .009  21.28  [0,26)  .222  96,30  [0.10]  .592 
Kingdom  (1.42)  (14.12)  (18.90) 
United Kingdom 
France  —0.87  [0.68)  —.002  —9.06  [072)  .024  24,30  [0.49]  .366 
(1.66)  (11.69)  (24.75) 
Germany  —1.46  [0.82]  —.004  —9.81  [0.75]  .032  —24.63  [0.74]  .187 
(1.41)  (10.11)  (28,18) 
Germany 
France  4,05  [0.06]  .033  63.00  [0.05)  .452  21,15  [0.49]  .086 
(2.28)  (17.43)  (21.42) 
Average  —0.22  [0.65]  9.34  [0.30)  31,92  [0.43] 
(0.55)  (7.55)  (22.38) 
Each entry reports estimates of  the coefficient 1,k  from the regression: 
Rtk 
—  +  + °t,k 
where z  is a constant and Pt is the logarithm of the real exchange rate.  Data are 
from 1974—1988.  The coefficients are bias—adjusted.  Numbers in  parentheses are 
standard errors, calculated using the Newey—West procedure.  The standard error of  the 
average accounts for cross correlation of the coefficients, as in  the text.  Numbers in 
brackets are p—values for the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero, based on 
the Monte Carlo distribution of  the adjusted t—statistic. Table 10:  Forecasting Precious Metal Returna Using Lagged Fundamentals 
Country  i 
1 Month 
p—value  R2  u 
12 Month 
p—value  R2 
48  Month 
p—value  F2 
Gold  094 
(1.79) 
[033]  .012  27.05 
(13.06) 
[0.17]  .235  13319 
(20.98) 
[006]  671 
Silver  2.92 
(2.51) 
[0.16]  .017  27.49 
(14.68) 
[0.20]  .188  109.00 
(32.75) 





[0.55]  .000  14.05 
(10.51) 
[0.19]  .094  29.69 
(35.31) 
[0.37]  .150 
Each entry reports estimates of  the coefficient  from the regression: 
Rt,k 
— ak + fik*(ztpt)  + °t,k 
where p  ia the logarithm of the reel price of  the metal or  the value of  the index. 
The fundamental z  is mssumed to he e constant.  Data  are from 1974—1968 for gold end 
ailver, end from 1959—1988 the  the metal index.  The coefficients ate hias—ed[usted. 
Mumbets in parentheses etc standard errors,  calculated using the  Mewey—5Jest  procedure. 
Numbers in  brackets mte p—vmlues for the null hypothesis that the edjusted coefficient 
is zero, based on  the Monte Carlo distribution of  the adjusted t—stetistic. Table 11:  Dividend Price Ratios and the Effect of  Volatility 
Rtk  — ak  + k*t_Pt)  7k*(Volt) + tt,k 
where z  is the logarithm of the real dividend for the market and volatility is the sum 
of squared monthly returns for the past twelve  months.  The sample period is 1960—1988; 
see Appendix Table Al for specifics.  The coefficients are bias—adjusted.  Standard 
errors, in  parentheses, are calculated using the Newey—West procedure with  11 or 47 
lags for 12 and 48  month returns, respectively. 
Country 
Australia 
I Month Return  12 Month Return 





















































France  0,08 
(0.99) 






































































































































Each entry reports estimates of  the coefficients  and 7k  from the  regression: Australia 
Austria 
































1960:  1 
1964:1 
1966:12 






The table shows the starting 
,a  for Swedish bond  returns 
1926:1  1926:1 
period for the equity and bond market regreasiuns.  The 
indicates that the sample period ends in 1988:1. 
Country  Equities 0.02 
0.01 
Figure  1 









Note:  Figure shows empirical distribution of the t—statistic 
for e 48—month regression.  The distributions are based on 
25, 000 replications.  The parameters are:  rho—gB,  delta—.75. and 
lambda—tO.  Each point is an interval  of .20 n  the distribution. 